CIÁ HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003 SECRET

AIR

SECURITY INFORMATION

7-756

AUG 1 2 1953

Chief, WH

RYBAT

Chief, DTROBALO

Operational

PBFORTUNE

- 1. I furnish you herewith the following documents pertaining to the latest phase of the subject matter:
 - A. Cable references (Attachment # 1)
 - B. Running log of chronologically arranged memoranda. (Attachment # 2)
 - C. Memoranda of seven (7) key questions by ARVILLE to Lawrence F. SILLENGE and answers by SILLENGE. (Attachment # 3)
- 2. Recommend you have someone review and analyze the memoranda for you.
- 3. This station would appreciate the benefit of any criticism or suggestions you may have, comerning its part in this phase.

RICHARD F. ARVILLE

Wash - 3 w/att.1 of 1-pp in trip; att. 2 of 70 pp; att. 3 of 2-pp in trip.
Files - 1 w/3 atts.

REBAT

SEC/LET

ATTACHMENT # 1 to 7-A-756

PBFORTUNE

CABLE LOG

1953		<u> 1953</u>	
22 July 22 July 22 July 23 July 23 July 25 July 1 August 2 August	DIR 12843 DIR 12844 DIR 12853 DIR 13042 DIR 13043 DIR 13312 DIR 14302 DIR 14315	22 July 24 July 24 July 25 July 27 July 30 July 31 July 31 July 31 July 31 July 31 July 31 August 2 August	SROBA 0492 SROBA 0494 SROBA 0497 SROBA 0500

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SECURITY INFORMATION ATT. # 3 to 1 3 to 1 3 to 1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED BY RICHARD F. ARVILLE TO LAWRENCE F.

SILLENCE ON 4 AUGUST 1953.

- 1. What was the cause, or causes, of the failure of our ship?
- 2. Was any effort made at any time to push the ship to maximum, or near maximum speed?
- 3. When engine failure, or other trouble developed, why was the ship not taken to a cove or the leeward side of an island?
- 4. Why did you desire to scuttle the ship, when it carried no cargo and presented no security hazard afloat?
- 5. Why did you state you would refuse rescue by a commercial ship?
- 6. Was anyone ill (not seasickness) or injured on the trip?
- 7. Was the performance of the engineers and crew satisfactory?
- 8. Do you recommend for or against further use of this same ship for the same or similar duty? Give details.



SECURITY AND AMENICAL (Copied from Long-Hand Adswers of SILLENCE)

ATTACHMENT # 3 to 7-756

Answers by Lawrence F. SILLENCE to Questions Stated by Richard F. ARVILLE:

- 1. The failure of the operation can be accounted to the inability to maintain the necessary power needed to insure navigability in the vessel. The loss of power added to the inclement weather aborted the operation.
- 2. After the initial failure of the engines the engines were used to maintain steerage alone. They were not at any time pushed.
- 3. No islands were available. Those that were were to the eastward and it was impossible to push into the weather. In addition, the islands we were concerned with were not topographically so to insure a safe anchorage.
- 4. The vessel and crew were without papers. There was a security hazard involved if no rescue was forthcoming and the vessel had to run to Nicaragua or Honduras. If the vessel could not be returned to I I felt it was safer on the bottom.
- 5. This decision was chiefly the C.O.S. I agreed because (1) I expected assistance from the Navy and (2) it would be costly to have a private vessel do the job. After 12 hours waiting for some Navy action I reconsidered and felt a private vessel could do the job as securely. Therefore I radiced our position to the Seaforth and told the Captain of the Pervis we could accept any assistance Navy or otherwise, that he could provide. He then contacted some merchant vessels but they never did appear.
- 6. Other than minor bruises, no.

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- 7. The performance of every man aboard was exceptional and I would not hesitate for a moment to request anyone of them to sail with me again.
- 8. I would recommend against the use of the vessel if the operation is to be performed at such a great distance. I believe the vessel could operate within 60 to 100 miles but to go further especially now that the weather is entering the hurricane season, would be subjecting the crew to a perhaps insurmountable hazard.

